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ABSTRACT
In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris
Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The
exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic
emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement
might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial
contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation
poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue
that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are
unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it
undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the
Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies
and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-
participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate
cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct
engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging
economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish
benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy.
Key policy insights
. US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the
Paris Agreement.
. US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance.
. Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global
climate policy.
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1. Introduction
On 8 November 2016, Donald J. Trump won the presidential election in the US. Trump’s rhetoric during the cam-
paign, his cabinet appointments and his first acts since taking office have made it abundantly clear that there
will be no US climate leadership during his tenure (Bomberg, 2017; Mehling, 2017). Most notably, in March 2017,
President Trump signed an executive order to reverse his predecessor’s policies to reduce US greenhouse gas
emissions (White House, 2017b). Then, on 1 June 2017, he announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Agree-
ment, a process that (because of stipulations in the treaty) would take four years to complete.1
The Trump era is not the first time the US has adopted a hostile posture toward multilateral climate
cooperation. The tenure of President George W. Bush between the years 2001 and 2008 was a difficult time
in climate cooperation. The Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol dealt a significant blow
to the treaty, despite its eventual entry into force in 2005. Continued US opposition to ambitious targets for
emission reductions also complicated the negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate regime. Major emerging econ-
omies, led by China and India, found US inaction a convenient cover for their own growing emissions (Clémen-
çon, 2008, p. 71).
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Understanding the impact of US non-cooperation on international climate policy under the Paris Agreement
is absolutely vital. For one thing, the US is the world’s second largest emitter and one of its wealthiest nations. In
2013, the US was responsible for 13.7% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including those from land-use
change and forestry (WRI, 2017). For another, Trump does not stand alone with his anti-climate change pro-
gramme. In Germany, the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) seeks to withdraw from all climate agree-
ments including their financial obligations.2 Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch right-wing Freedom Party
(PVV), is a notorious denier of anthropogenic climate change. In France, Le Pen’s National Front party has
described the UNFCCC as a ‘communist project’.3
This article provides a contribution to the proliferating and important literature on US non-cooperation in
environmental policy. A key point across this literature is that US non-cooperation is largely a structural issue,
related to the particularities of the US political system, which make it hard for US presidents to adopt environ-
mental regulations or ratify multilateral agreements (Bang, Hovi, & Sprinz, 2012; Depledge, 2005; DeSombre,
2000; Kemp, 2016). Most of these studies date from before the election of Trump and his formal decision to with-
draw from the Paris Agreement. Kemp (2017b) deserves credit for anticipating the US exit from Paris and explor-
ing legal options to deal with a US non-party, including allowing the inclusion of individual US states. However,
assessing the full effects of Trump’s policies and actions can only be done ex post.
Our goal here is to assess the extent to which climate cooperation under the Paris Agreement is threatened
by President Trump’s hostile views of the regime and, to the extent there is a real threat, to consider protective
measures. We use the term non-cooperation to denote any situation in which a country is not engaging con-
structively in the global climate regime. A continuum rather than a binary, the term covers the possibilities of
active opposition and resistance to the goals of international climate policy, or simple lack of any meaningful
action to curb emissions and help developing countries. Non-cooperation should not be conflated with legal
withdrawal. Even if the US had not announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trump adminis-
tration could still have reversed many domestic climate policies, since the Paris Agreement has no binding
requirements regarding actual emissions levels (Bordoff, 2017). Worse, a recalcitrant US could have acted as
a regime spoiler from within the Paris Agreement, e.g. by obstructing the negotiations on the ‘Paris rulebook’
(Kemp, 2017a). Nor is non-cooperation a unique US feature. Australia, an industrialized country, is currently
on track to significantly increase its domestic emissions and miss its pledge while opening new coal mines
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017a). To a certain degree, this can also be classified as non-cooperation.
Our central argument is that US non-cooperation does not present amajor threat to US emissions, whichmight
keep falling regardless of federal policy. Nor does it undermine increasingly ambitious emission reductions around
the world, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policy while the cost
of low-carbon technologies has come down significantly. Amore serious threat is found in US non-participation in
climate financing, particularly with regard to the capitalization of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). We suggest two
opportunities tomitigate the effects of US non-cooperation: (i) the EuropeanUnion, China and India could step up
to replaceUS climate leadership and (ii) domestic coalitions of citizens,municipalities, businesses and other actors
that are in favour of climate change could be entrenched through targeted policies and framing, so that climate
policies worldwide become more resilient to electoral cycles and shocks.
In the next section, we summarize the literature on leadership in climate policy and apply it to the case of the
US. We then discuss how US non-cooperation would shape international negotiations and domestic policies.
The last section emphasizes the importance of engaging with emerging economies and dealing with domestic
political uncertainty for the future of the Paris Agreement.
2. US climate leadership under Obama
To assess the effects of US non-cooperation on the Paris Agreement, our baseline assumption is that the US
played a leadership role under the Obama administration. At least four types of leadership can be distinguished
in international environmental negotiations. Power-based leadership achieves outcomes by deploying threats
and promises. For example, the economic might and financial resources of the US mean that a proactive Pre-
sident could entice emerging economies to participate with promises of climate finance (Ghosh & Woods,
2009) or, in an extreme scenario, the threat of carbon tariffs (Weber & Peters, 2009). Directional leadership is
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based on a positive example that encourages others to follow, such as demonstrating the feasibility of renew-
able energy or clean technology development (Urpelainen, 2011). Entrepreneurial leadership refers to the leader’s
skilful activities in negotiations. For example, the US President might broker deals or build coalitions that help to
produce better cooperation outcomes. Intellectual leadership, finally, involves the production and promotion of
new ideas and solutions (Andresen & Agrawala, 2002; Skodvin & Andresen, 2006; Young, 1991).
The US position on climate change has oscillated considerably over time between phases of active leadership
and phases of passivity (Bang & Schreurs, 2016). Even though the US had long displayed intellectual leadership
in sponsoring scientific research on climate change, and it played a key role in the establishment of the Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, it only reluctantly agreed to launch negotiations on a climate
change convention and subsequently resisted efforts to establish emission targets (Depledge, 2005).
Under the Clinton-Gore administration, the US conceded to negotiate binding emission reduction targets,
while it kept pressing for flexibility mechanisms, including international emissions trading (Harrison, 2007).
The election of a Republican-dominated Congress in late 1994 meant that domestic opposition was strong to
binding targets and timetables, largely out of fear that US firms would lose their competitiveness on global
markets. The US signed the Kyoto Protocol in late 1998, but the Clinton administration did not present the
Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification and, in 2001, the freshly elected Bush administration announced
that it would not ratify Kyoto. This provided an opportunity for the European Union to take on a position of lea-
dership on climate change (Schreurs & Tiberghien, 2007).
Still, the Bush administration was keen on legitimizing its absence from Kyoto by pursuing an alternative,
mostly voluntary, technology-driven strategy (Eckersley, 2007). It assumed an entrepreneurial leadership role
in setting up narrowly focused regimes and clubs outside of the UNFCCC, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership
in 2005, the Major Economies Meeting in 2007 and a host of technology-oriented partnerships (De Coninck,
Fischer, Newell, & Ueno, 2008; Lesage, Van de Graaf, & Westphal, 2010), thus contributing to the fragmentation
of the global climate regime (Keohane & Victor, 2011).
With the 2008 election of Obama, the US re-engaged in the multilateral climate change negotiations. It
signed onto the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Paris Agreement of 2015, while also presenting voluntary
pledges to reduce emissions. Yet, the idiosyncrasies of the US political system have continued to hamper efforts
to reassert US climate leadership (Kemp, 2016; Paterson, 2009), pushing the Obama administration to pursue
less traditional political strategies in climate policy (Bang & Schreurs, 2016; Skodvin & Andresen, 2009). The
US showed it can rapidly reduce its emissions, even without agreeing to binding emission reduction targets.
US carbon emissions from the energy sector seem to have peaked in 2007 and had declined by 14% by the
end of 2016, thanks to a host of factors such as the Great Recession but also increasingly the shift from coal
to natural gas and wind in the electric power sector (Feng, Davis, Sun, & Hubacek, 2015; Hausfather, 2017). In
the same period, China’s emissions rose by almost 40% and India’s emissions even by as much as 45% (WRI,
2017). The Obama administration also engaged in entrepreneurial leadership through bilateral diplomacy,
and particularly its outreach to China. The US–China agreement of November 2014 was an important catalyst
that generated momentum for achieving the Paris Agreement (Dimitrov, 2016; White House, 2014).4
3. The impacts of US non-cooperation
The Trump administration’s policies clearly constitute a move from Obama-era leadership. For international
climate policy, US non-cooperation poses at least three different threats: (i) the US might miss its domestic emis-
sion reduction pledges; (ii) other parties might water down their commitments in return, undermining the
pledge-and-review system which is supposed to ratchet up emission reduction targets over time and (iii) the
lack of US contributions might undermine climate finance.5 Of the three threats, the threat to climate finance
is the most severe.
3.1. Missing emission pledges
The US has set near-term targets to reduce GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 (pledge made under the Copenha-
gen Accord) and 26–28% by 2025 (nationally determined contribution, or NDC, as submitted to the Paris
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Agreement), with both goals defined relative to 2005 levels (United States, 2015). As required under the Paris
Agreement, the US has presented a mid-century strategy that envisions economy-wide net GHG emissions’
reductions of 80% or more below 2005 levels by 2050 (White House, 2016).
The Clean Power Plan was the single most important element of the Obama administration’s climate strategy,
in support of its Paris pledge. It aimed to cut CO2 emissions from power plants by 32% below 2005 levels by
2030. However, the US NDC has been criticized for being at the least ambitious end of what would be a fair con-
tribution to the Paris goals of limiting global warming to well below 2◦C (Climate Action Tracker, 2017b), so the
Paris goals were always contingent on other parties making a comparably greater effort. Moreover, by the end of
Obama’s tenure, it was clear that existing federal climate policies were not going to deliver the pledged emis-
sions reduction by 2025 (Greenblatt & Wei, 2016).
As mentioned, in March 2015, President Trump signed an Executive Order to rescind the Clean Power Plan
(White House, 2017b). But even in the absence of the Clean Power Plan, US emissions are unlikely to increase. A
recent analysis by the Climate Action Tracker notes that Trump’s cancellation of the Clean Power Plan would
leave US emissions roughly at today’s levels in 2025 and 2030, as sub-national climate policies and the declining
competitiveness of coal in power generation prevent rapid emission increases (CAT, 2017). Galik, Decarolis, & Fell
(2017) similarly find that emission declines in the energy sector are likely to continue, regardless of Trump’s dis-
mantling of federal climate policies, but they note that emissions in the land use and built environment sector
are subject to considerable uncertainty.
In short, it is unlikely that Trump’s actions to date will reverse key trends in US emissions: they are flat or in
decline, but not fast enough to meet the US pledge, which itself was inadequate to realize the Paris goals. These
elements have not changed since Trump took office, though his anti-climate policies have obviously made
things worse. Any reductions in US emissions under the current administration are likely to be minor, and US
emissions are still completely at odds with what would be a fair share of global effort to keep global
warming below 2◦C (Climate Action Tracker, 2017b).
It is also likely that US states, cities and businesses will contribute to filling any gap left by federal inaction.
States such as California – the world’s sixth largest economy if it was a sovereign state 6 – have in the past shown
their ability to reduce their emissions with aggressive policies even in the absence of federal support (Rabe,
2004; Urpelainen, 2009). Although the effectiveness of sub-national policy has varied widely and sometimes
amounted to little more than window dressing, key state policies such as renewable portfolio standards have
proven their effectiveness in the US (Barbose et al., 2016). Besides states, both municipalities and companies
have also shown a marked willingness to ‘experiment’ with new climate policies (Hoffmann, 2011). Scholars
such as Hale (2011) have proposed that such actors around the world could constitute a ‘climate coalition of
the willing’ and make a substantial contribution to emission reductions, regardless of the choices of national
authorities. The surge of non-state climate action can further reduce the vulnerability of the pledge-and-
review system to US non-cooperation. If the federal government remains inactive in the face of climate
change, ambitious climate action at lower levels of government can reassure other governments, and non-
state actors outside the US to continue their efforts to reduce emissions.
3.2. Undermining pledge and review
Globally, Trump’s policies could cause a delay in mitigation that could render the 2◦C target unachievable if a
global precedent is set (Sanderson & Knutti, 2016), which brings us to the pledge-and-review system. The
pledge-and-review system of the Paris Agreement is based on regular – typically every five years – reviews
and updates of the parties’ NDCs. US non-participation would certainly present a grave threat to other
parties’ willingness to ratchet up their contributions if these contributions were based on the logic of reciprocity,
so that other countries increase their contributions to entice the US to contribute more.
However, this is not the case. The Paris Agreement is built on the notion of domestically driven climate action,
which allows countries to determine their mitigation efforts independently and voluntarily (Falkner, 2016). As a
result, countries’ NDCs reflect a variety of domestic considerations including public opinion, the co-benefits of
climate action (e.g. air pollution and energy security), and efforts to build globally competitive clean technology
industries. US non-participation does not by any means reduce the weight of these considerations. To the
4 J. URPELAINEN AND T. VAN DE GRAAF
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [G
he
nt 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Li
br
ary
] a
t 0
4:4
2 1
5 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
contrary, it offers an opportunity for other countries to pull ahead in the race to develop the energy technologies
of tomorrow (Bordoff, 2017).
The pledge-and-review process relies on peer pressure and ‘naming and shaming’ tactics to create a positive
spiral of increased ambition over time, which is needed to deliver on long-term climate stabilization goals
(Falkner, 2016). While countries may find it advantageous to be seen as global leaders, these reputational incen-
tives are unlikely to override conflicting domestic interests. For example, the US stood firm in its decision not to
ratify Kyoto despite facing universal condemnation (Eckersley, 2007). The US is so far the only country to walk
away from the Paris Agreement, and the risk that this sets in motion a domino effect of other countries scaling
down their pledges hinges entirely on how the US exit alters the domestic calculations that now primarily drive
national climate policies. Rather than triggering a downward spiral of lower ambition, the US exit might actually
inspire other countries to step up their game and assume global climate leadership, while reaping the soft
power benefits that come with it. Indeed, Canada has already increased its contributions to the IPCC to make
up for the loss of US funding (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017).
In addition, and as noted above, US emissions are a decreasing share of the world total. Emissions in the US
trend downward in the long run, with carbon-intensive coal being initially replaced by natural gas and ultimately
renewable power: even without any new policies at all, US emissions would probably not grow. Therefore, other
countries have little reason to worry that US non-participation would result in a sharp increase in US emissions –
the drivers of US emission reductions appear to be economic, not political. Even though Trump’s policies may
slow down the decline of coal, for example, long-term economic trends favour cheap gas and renewables (EIA,
2017).
In fact, this is true for a lot of countries. Progressive policies, technical innovation and greater economies of
scale have pushed down the costs of low-carbon technologies. For example, the unit costs of solar photovoltaics
dropped more than 60% between 2009 and 2016, making it a cost-effective energy source in many parts of the
world (UNEP, 2016). Thanks to falling costs and rising investment, renewables contributed almost two-thirds of
the new power generation capacity added worldwide in 2016 (REN21, 2017). The growing share of renewables
and improvements in energy efficiency are decoupling emissions from economic growth, with global energy-
related CO2 emissions being nearly flat in 2016 for the third consecutive year (IEA, 2017).
In short, US emissions are flat-lining and unlikely to increase because of the policies and actions of President
Trump. However, this does not mean that the emission reduction goals of the Paris Agreement will be met. To
level out the global average temperature increase at two degrees Celsius, much deeper cuts are needed than
what is pledged in the NDCs (Rogelj et al., 2016).
3.3. Retracted financing
The most immediate threat of US non-cooperation for the Paris Agreement relates to climate finance. Although
the importance of the US as an emitter is declining, it remains the largest and wealthiest economy among the
industrialized countries. To gauge the impact of US non-cooperation, it is necessary to understand how large a
role the US plays in providing public contributions to international initiatives for climate adaptation and
mitigation.
According to the most recent numbers provided by the US government to the UNFCCC (USDS, 2016), the US
delivered about US$ 2.7 b per year in climate finance in 2013 and 2014. Large amounts of this funding came as
loans or export credits. A much smaller chunk was provided to the World Bank or specialized UN funds and facili-
ties. The US contribution is thus more than 10% of the total public climate finance that, according to estimates
by the UNFCCC, flowed from developed to developing countries in 2013 and in 2014 (UNFCCC, 2016b). This is no
small contribution for a single country to make, even when compared to other major bilateral donors. Germany
donated US$ 2.5 and 2.8 b in 2013 and 2014, respectively. France donated US$ 3.0 and 3.7 b, while Japan
donated US$ 8.1 and 8.2 b.
The US alone has also pledged US$ 3 b to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is the main financing tool of
the UNFCCC. This would make the US the largest single contributor to the US$ 10.3 b initial capitalization goal of
the GCF but, to date, the US only delivered US$ 1 b. The new administration has made it amply clear that the
remaining US$ 2 b will not be deposited, jeopardizing about 20% of the Fund’s current budget, and President
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Trump’s proposed budget for 2018 would even stop funding the UNFCCC secretariat and the IPCC (White House,
2017a).7
At the 2009 Copenhagen conference, developed countries agreed to mobilize US$ 100 b per year by 2020 to
help developing countries cope with a changing climate and to help them bypass fossil-fueled development in
favour of cleaner alternatives. This goal was reaffirmed in Paris. Without US financial contributions, it seems unli-
kely that other industrialized countries would be able to contribute enough to meet the goal. Even if private
finance would – partially or wholly – close the gap, there is a chance that the poorest developing nations
would be severely affected. That is because public bodies take on risk-return positions that a private investor
would not bear. Public finance also includes initiatives to build governance capacity, cut down on corruption
and develop infrastructure – in short, outcomes that do not offer an immediate return on investment, but
are necessary pillars of a thriving economy. The poorest developing countries typically lack developed capital
markets – e.g. a well-functioning banking system – requiring them to rely, instead, on international capital
markets and, more specifically, development banks (Buchner, Falconer, Hervé-Mignucci, Trabacchi, & Brinkman,
2011).
The pernicious effects of US non-cooperation on climate finance reach well beyond the immediate harm that
reduced financial support for mitigation and adaptation does. Over time, US absence from climate finance
would affirm the suspicion among least developed and emerging economies that the industrialized countries
are untrustworthy because there is no firm domestic political consensus in favour of climate action. Thus,
although we see no reason to worry about the immediate effects of US non-participation on pledge and
review, in the long run the issue of climate finance could derail efforts to increase the ambition level of national
mitigation plans so that the increase in global temperatures relative to pre-industrial times would more likely
than not remain below two degrees Celsius. Indeed, both least developed and emerging economies tend to
condition their ambition on external assistance in their NDCs (UNFCCC, 2016a), meaning that the lack of
climate finance could reduce the ambition level of many important emitters.8
4. Responses to US non-cooperation
Based on the threat assessment above, we see two critical responses to US non-participation: leadership from
emerging economies and domestic policies that insulate climate policies against electoral volatility and
uncertainty.
4.1. Climate leadership from emerging economies
The abdication of climate leadership by the US creates the opportunity for other countries to step in and
assume a leadership position. The European Union could fill the gap, as it did during the Bush years.
Since the 2009 Copenhagen summit, where the EU had been barred from the key discussions, the EU has
assumed the role of ‘leadiator’, combining traditional leadership with mediation between different parties
(Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013; Oberthür & Groen, 2017). As Europe’s faith in the global moral, economic
and security leadership of the US is fading, European countries are increasingly looking elsewhere for coalition
partners (Schreurs, 2017).
They should look in the first place to deeper engagement with emerging economies, especially China and
India. Emerging economies – by far the most important source of future emission growth – now face more
pressure to engage in climate action than ever before. Equity concerns notwithstanding, the main development
threatening to increase the rate of climate change is the rapid growth of emissions from emerging economies
such as India. Fortunately, emerging economies increasingly recognize the benefits of climate action in terms of
both domestic ‘co-benefits’ (Dubash, 2013) and international reputation. China, India and other emerging econ-
omies see value in clean energy sources, such as solar or wind power, and energy conservation as they strive to
improve their energy security and reduce air pollution. An increase in climate policy ambition also fits well to the
broader strategic goals of China and India. As both countries attempt to increase their soft power and influence
in world politics, the gap left by US non-participation could be a strategic opportunity for the two countries to fill
the leadership void.
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For years, countries such as China and India had objected to adopting commitments in the context of global
climate negotiations until the developed countries had, as a whole, reduced their emissions. Since the 2009
Copenhagen summit, however, both countries have begun to make commitments to reduce the emission inten-
sity of their GDP (Table 1). Both countries made it clear that their commitments were subject to the developed
countries fulfilling their responsibilities with regard to financial and technology transfers under the UNFCCC
(Gupta, 2016). Thus, China and India – along with many other rapidly growing economies – are offering to
act on climate, but only if the industrialized countries support these efforts with financial assistance and transfers
of clean technology. Again, we see the importance of climate finance.
China, which has played an important role in reducing the cost of renewable energy technology in world
markets (PCT, 2009), could reap commercial benefits from deeper cooperation on decarbonization with other
countries. At the same time, energy security plays a major role in China’s energy strategy (Andrews-Speed,
2012), and investments in renewables and energy conservation contribute to achieving that goal. Responding
to severe air pollution problems, China has already implemented ambitious policies to reduce its dependence
on coal, resulting in a standstill in the construction of new coal-fired power plants (Shearer, Ghio, Myllyvirta, Yu,
& Nace, 2017). Since China’s GDP growth is slowing down and the country is experiencing a structural shift away
from heavy industry, it is highly plausible that the country’s consumption of coal has effectively peaked (Qi,
Stern, Wu, Lu, & Green, 2016) and its CO2 emissions might peak in the decade before 2025 (Green & Stern,
2017). This new model of economic development at home is key to explaining China’s transformation into a
more constructive participant in the multilateral climate negotiations in the run-up to the 2015 Paris climate
summit (Hilton & Kerr, 2017). On the other hand, China continues to finance and construct coal-fired power
plants in other countries, especially those that belong to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s flagship One Belt,
One Road Initiative (Peng, Chang, & Liwen, 2017). Ending public support for coal-fired power generation capacity
outside China thus presents a major opportunity for climate leadership for China.
India, on the other hand, faces serious energy security threats in the South Asian regional context (Singh,
Jamasb, Nepal, & Toman, 2015). Renewable energy is one way to reduce the country’s dependence on imported
fuels. India’s own energy resources are very limited, as the only abundant domestic energy source is low-quality
coal. The country also suffers from very high levels of air pollution in Delhi and many other urban areas. The
Modi government’s ambitious targets for renewable energy deployment – 175 GW of capacity by 2022 (NITI-
Ayog, 2015) – suggest an opportunity to find cleaner alternatives to coal in power generation, though
implementation will present a momentous challenge. At the same time, India’s June 2017 Draft National
Energy Policy continues to assume that in the baseline scenario, India’s coal-fired generation capacity will
more than double from less than 200 to over 440 GW by the year 2040 (NITI-Ayog, 2017). Under rapidly
falling renewable power generation prices, India can claim climate leadership by making a clear commitment
to focusing on alternatives to coal.
Against this backdrop, US non-cooperation presents an opportunity for deeper engagement of the EU with
emerging economies. One noteworthy development in this regard is the decision by China and the EU to
strengthen their climate cooperation as well as to work jointly to implement and strengthen the Paris Agree-
ment (European Commission, 2017). Together with Canada, these parties held a ministerial climate summit
back-to-back to an IPCC meeting in early September 2017 to advance the goals of Paris. India and France
have already taken the lead in setting up an International Solar Alliance during COP21 in Paris. During the
G20 leaders’ summit in July 2017, the US was totally isolated as the final communique read: ‘We take note of
the decision of the United States of America to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.’ It added: ‘The leaders of
the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversible’ (G20, 2017).
Setting up new institutions and isolating the US can be seen as examples of entrepreneurial leadership. While
important, the litmus test of these initiatives ultimately remains implementation. For any of these countries to
Table 1. Copenhagen and Paris pledges: China and India.
% cut in carbon intensity… China India
Copenhagen pledges … between 2005 and 2020 40–45% 20–25%
Paris pledges … between 2005 and 2030 60–65% 33–35%
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claim a directional leadership position in tackling climate change, their national mitigation goals need to be
strengthened. Taking into account various equity concepts, one study found that the EU’s domestic 2030
reduction target would have to be more than doubled (61% instead of 27% below 2010 by 2030). The percen-
tage gap is even higher for China’s goal to peak fossil CO2 emissions by 2030 compared to 2010 (Meinshausen
et al., 2015; see also du Pont et al., 2017).
In contrast, punitive measures such as border tax adjustments against the US (an example of power-based
leadership) are unlikely to play a constructive role, as they would threaten to trigger a trade war and thus
undermine the interests of key emerging economies in the long run. Indeed, Böhringer & Rutherford
(2017) find that
[g]iven the possibility of retaliatory tariffs across all imported goods, carbon tariffs do not constitute a credible threat for the
US. A tariff war with its main trading partners China and Europe might make the US worse off than compliance to the Paris
Agreement but China, in particular, should prefer US defection to a tariff war.
4.2. Dealing with domestic political uncertainty
The other important response to US non-cooperation is to proof the Paris Agreement against domestic political
uncertainty. Although the Trump presidency was a great surprise to many commentators, there has always been
a strong undercurrent against progressive climate policies in the US. This is probably the reason why the Obama
administration pushed so hard during the negotiations to design the Paris Agreement in a way that would allow
it to bypass Senate ratification and simply ‘accept’ the accord through an Executive Order (Wirth, 2016). Trump’s
electoral victory is also part of a broad populist wave across the globe. Another important case is Brexit, the
British referendum on leaving the European Union. These domestic political shocks call into question the
assumption that the world can now count on key industrialized and emerging economies to maintain unani-
mous support for climate action. The consensus on climate action appears to be restricted to mainstream pol-
itical parties. To protect the Paris Agreement from domestic political turmoil, it is thus important to consider
domestic strategy.
One strategy to achieve this goal would be to lock-in climate policies as they are developed, so that they are
resilient to electoral cycles and shocks. To some extent, this could be achieved through litigation and courts. In
constitutional democracies such as the US, there are already several legal guardrails in place that prevent a quick
dismantling of existing climate policies. However, the strategy of litigation faces strict limits as its success
depends considerably on individual country constituents and legal precedent. Moreover, litigation cuts both
ways. Trump’s Executive Order of March 2017 is currently facing legal challenges from environmentalists, just
as Obama’s Clean Power Plan was challenged in courts.
A more promising strategy is the targeted expansion of the domestic political coalition in favour of climate
action. This can be achieved through green industrial policies that offer significant benefits to a small group of
economic actors, while imposing only moderate costs on society (e.g. renewable fuel standards, feed-in tariffs,
subsidies, etc.). For example, one very important policy that the Trump presidency is not targeting is the federal
production tax credit for renewable energy. This tax credit generates direct benefits to many Republican elec-
toral districts, and thus the policy enjoys broad bi-partisan support in Congress. Such policies are politically resi-
lient because their beneficiaries will be disproportionately motivated to lobby for or defend them in the political
process (Jenkins, 2014).
Economists generally regard such targeted policies that concentrate benefits in a visible way as less efficient
than carbon pricing, because they tend to have a very high cost per ton of greenhouse gas emissions they abate
(e.g. Nordhaus, 1992; Stavins, 1997). But research in political science suggests that targeted, sector-specific pol-
icies bring new economic constituencies into coalitions for decarbonization, while neutralizing opposition from
carbon-intensive industries (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2013; Meckling, Kelsey, Biber, & Zysman, 2015). In domestic poli-
tics, such a favourable constituency is particularly important at a time when climate policy itself could fall prey to
electoral populism.
There are also ways to increase the electoral resilience even of such policies (like carbon taxes) that have no
direct private beneficiaries, beyond the general social benefits of climate mitigation. The creative use of
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revenues from carbon taxes can help to cement the political acceptability of such a tax and increase its environ-
mental efficacy, for instance when the revenues are used to support clean energy research and development
(Fischer, 2008). A related strategy is an increased emphasis on co-benefits that benefit interest groups across
the board, and that are salient to citizens and voters. Even though climate change is a bête noire for many con-
servatives and the fossil fuel industry, broad swaths of the public benefit from such co-benefits as green jobs and
improved air quality (Nemet, Holloway, & Meier, 2010). Focusing on near-term benefits could help to close the
temporal and geographic mismatch between mitigation costs and benefits (Jenkins, 2014).
In creating a domestic political constituency for climate action, it is important to avoid fuelling the fires of
partisan polarization over the issue. As Nordhaus & Trembath (2017) note, Trump’s decision to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement had a domestic audience of Republicans who consider climate change an anathema.
If domestic climate policies are owned by one political party or movement at the expense of others, it is possible
that domestic uncertainties are actually compounded. In a less polarized environment, for example, Trump
might have not withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. We thus caution against overly partisan and polarizing
strategies to expand the climate advocacy coalition. If the goal is to reduce domestic political uncertainty, activi-
ties that have broad popular support are more effective. One example might be clean technology innovation.
Domestic entrenchment may also be fostered through non-state and community action on climate change.
Since November 2016, more than one thousand companies and investors have urged President Trump to
uphold the goals of the Paris Agreement. The signatures include major companies such as Nike, Unilever and
DuPont.9 They were joined by companies such as Google, Facebook, Intel and Microsoft, and oil companies
BP and Shell, which sent a letter to President Trump in April 2017, expressing their support for continued par-
ticipation by the US in the Paris Agreement.10 These voices show that there is a strong business case to be made
for climate policies, especially for the IT, high tech, entertainment and retail industries, where carbon constraints
do not threaten to significantly diminish profit margins, and where the customer base tends to directly reward
green and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Such a coalition of business actors in favour of dec-
arbonization can reduce uncertainty about climate policy if it is powerful enough to counter the influence of
those sectors that expect to lose from carbon constraints, such as the coal sector and heavy, energy-intensive
industries.
Strengthening state, municipal, local and community-owned energy projects, finally, could further build
support and insulate climate policies from electoral cycles. Sub- and non-state actions not just hold the
promise of helping to advance the goals of the Paris Agreement, but also to deliver policy innovation, exper-
imentation, demonstration effects and best practices that can diffuse transnationally (Chan et al., 2015).
While there is no guarantee that these benefits will be realized, Betsill (2017) notes that the response to Presi-
dent Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has been qualitatively different from the reaction when Pre-
sident George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, implying that, in certain respects, a global normative
shift has occurred and a strong non-state constituency exists that supports ambitious climate policy.
5. Conclusion
The US is no longer the pivotal player it used to be in climate policy, but President Trump’s non-cooperation
remains a significant threat to the Paris Agreement nonetheless. We are optimistic about the robustness of
the pledge-and-review approach to ratcheting up the commitments of different countries, but we see
climate finance as a potential victim of Trump’s hostility to global climate cooperation. Climate finance is impor-
tant for the big picture because it can build trust between industrialized, emerging and developing countries. If
US non-participation compromises climate finance, then the most important antidote is for industrialized
countries to engage with emerging economies by other means.
More generally, Trump’s victory, which surprised many, calls into question the idea that domestic politics no
longer raises barriers to climate cooperation. The rise of right-wing populist parties in the industrialized world
and elsewhere opens a window of opportunity for interest groups that oppose climate policy, as one of the key
tenets of contemporary (right-wing) populism is a profound distrust of experts and elites. Multilateral climate
accords such as the Paris Agreement are often portrayed as part of the ‘establishment’ that populist voices
are keen to overthrow. A key lesson from Trump’s climate non-policy is the importance of building broad
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coalitions that benefit from climate policies – regardless of whether or not they are called that, or something
else, in the public discourse.
To be sure, compensating for the lack of US leadership is not going to be easy. In the absence of decisive
American or European leadership, China and India have good reasons to remain cautious second-movers
even though they are less opposed to climate mitigation than in the past. One way to solve these problems
could be a trilateral climate agreement among the European Union, China and India with a heavy emphasis
on co-benefits, commercial opportunities and energy security from low-carbon technologies.
Notes
1. Notably, though, the Trump administration has not discussed the possibility of withdrawing from the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
2. See http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-minuszuwanderung-und-ausstieg-aus-allen-klimaschutzorganisationen-1.
3412470 (accessed May 5, 2017).
3. See http://inthesetimes.com/article/18676/trump_le_pen_front_national_paris_climate_change_talks_and_econationalism
(accessed May 5, 2017).
4. It should be noted that the Obama administration also oversaw the construction of new export terminals for liquefied natural
gas and lifted the 40-year-old crude oil export embargo. The effects of natural gas exports on the climate are complex and
depend on whether the exports displace coal or low-carbon energy sources, such as nuclear and wind power (Newell &
Raimi, 2014). Repealing the oil export ban, in turn, was part of a package deal that included an extension of tax credits for
wind and solar energy (Colgan & Van de Graaf, 2017).
5. Another possible problem is US obstructionism in the negotiations. However, we focus here instead on the direct effects of
non-cooperation on other countries’ incentives to act.
6. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP by state,
April 2017.
7. The Trump administration’s cuts to funding for domestic climate research is a related problem.
8. Similarly, a lack of US funding for the UNFCCC and IPCC could compromise the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
9. The list of signatories is available at: http://lowcarbonusa.org/business.
10. Letter available from: https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/business-letter-white-house-paris-agreement-final-04-26-2017.pdf.
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